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NCAA Division I Men's Basketball Coaching Contracts: A Comparative Analysis of Incentives for Athletic and Academic Team Performance Between 2009 and 2012

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The purpose of the current study was to compare the athletic and academic team performance incentive clauses of Division I men's head basketball coaches participating in the 2012 NCAA Division I Men's Basketball Tournament. A secondary purpose was to conduct a comparative analysis between the 2009 and 2012 NCAA Division I Men's Basketball athletic and academic team performance contract incentives. A content analyses was conducted on the 68 coaches' compensation contracts listed in the 2012 USAToday Coaches' Compensation database. Results indicated these coaches had potential athletic team performance incentives equaling $13,174,858.00 compared to potential academic team performance incentives of $1,230,328.00. When compared to the previous results of Wilson, et al. (2011), Non-Automatic Qualifying (N-AQ) conference school coaches' annual pay increased 87.5% from 2009 to 2012 with average salaries increasing from $357,440.00 in 2009 to $513,872.00 in 2012. Automatic Qualifying (AQ) conference school coaches experienced a reduction in potential academic incentive payouts, while (N-AQ) conference school coaches experienced a 1074% increase in possible academic incentives from 2009 to 2012 with academic incentives increasing from $19,500 in 2009 to $229,000.00 in 2012. These results indicate the intercollegiate "arms race" continues to expand regardless of conference affiliation in Division I men's basketball head coach compensation.

Over the last 15 years the empirical research conducted on intercollegiate athletics has escalated and includes areas such as: athletics role within the educational mission of higher education (Sack & Staurowsky, 1998; Shulman & Bowen, 2001; Sperber, 2000); the African-American athlete intercollegiate experiences (Hawkins, 2010); and the role intercollegiate athletics plays in the overall branding of a university (Bruening & Lee, 2007; Clark, Apostolopoulou, Branvold, & Synowka, 2009). In addition, during this time period a plethora of research has focused on the "arms race" that has developed in intercollegiate athletics (Denhart & Vedder, 2010). Orzag and Israel (2009, p. 11) defined this "arms race" as "increased

operating expenditures by schools in a conference associated with increases at other schools in the same conference." Budig (2007, p.283) emphasized this race, "is one fueled by an insatiable appetite on the part of students, alumni, and the general public for college athletic success." This "insatiable appetite" has created an atmosphere of ever expanding new university athletic facilities construction, ever increasing conference television broadcasting rights packages, and ever increasing coaching compensation.

In August, 2012 the University of Southern California athletics department opened the $70 million dollar John McKay Center. This facility contains a two-story video wall, an underground 40 yard indoor practice facility, and 114 iPads installed in all football lockers (Moura, 2012). During this same time period, the University of Tennessee's football coaches and players moved into a new $45 million dollar, 145,000 square-foot football training facility (Gribble, 2012) and fellow Southeastern Conference (SEC) member, the University of Alabama, is building a $29 million dollar facility that will house a new strength training room.

Also on a meteoric rise are the conference television contracts to broadcast intercollegiate athletics. In 2012, the six Automatic Qualifying (AQ) conferences (ACC, Big East, Big Ten, Big 12, Pac-12 and SEC) made $1.14 billion dollars in broadcast fees (Peloquin, 2012). On August 15, 2012 the Pacific Athletic Conference (Pac-12) launched its own conference television network. The Pac-12 Network, in addition to their 12-year, $3 billion deal with Fox and ESPN, expects to provide nearly $30 million dollars annually to its member institutions (Martin, 2012). The Pac-12 will join the previously formed Big Ten Network and the Texas Longhorn Network as conference and school television networks. The Big 12 Conference just agreed to a 13-year television rights deal with ESPN and Fox Networks for $2.6 billion dollars (Eichelberger, 2012). Facility construction and television rights deals illustrate the attempt by universities to maximize revenues, and create a financial situation that lends support to what Dr. Richard Southall calls, "strong evidence that college athletics has a commercial institutional logic" (Schrotenboer, 2012). Further evidence supporting this "commercial institutional logic" can be found in Division I men's basketball head coaches' compensation packages. To best illustrate the ever expanding increase in college coaching compensation packages an in-depth review of the University of Kentucky Men's Head Basketball Coach John Calipari's contract is provided.

The University of Kentucky (UK) men's basketball team won the 2012 National Collegiate Athletic Association's (NCAA) National Championship. During this academic year (2011-2012), UK paid Coach John Calipari a total of $5,900,000. Further investigation of Coach Calipari's contract illustrates the following compensation package: $400,000 (base salary); $3,800,000 (broadcasting and endorsements); $1,000,000 (longevity payment); $50,000 (regular season SEC champion); $100,000 (Sweet 16 participant); $175,000 (Final Four participant); and $375,000 (National Champion bonus) (USAToday, 2012). In other words, Coach Calipari earned an average of $155,263.15 per team win; an average of $1,906.00 per team point scored; and an average of $16,164.38 per day for the fiscal year 2011-2012.

One of the earliest investigations into college coaching compensation, Putler and Wolfe (1999) identified four success criteria (team academic performance: on-field performance; student-athlete behavior; & revenue performance) that factor into determining coaches' compensation. Results indicated coaches were highest incentivized for on-field team performance. Inoue, Kent,Plehn-Dujowich, and Swanson (2011) analyzed the 2006 NCAA Football Bowl Series (FBS) head football coaches' incentive compensation and found additional support to Putler and Wolfe.

Published in the Marquette Sports Law Review, Greenberg and Smith (2006) provided an analysis of NCAA Division I assistant football and men's basketball coaches' contracts. The researchers attempted to identify the legal rights and various protections these contracts gave coaches. Through an examination of several assistant coaches' contracts a list of conclusions were produced: lack of assistant coach contract consistency; contracts differ in length; some coaches do not have a written agreement to coach; a rise in assistant coach compensation at larger schools; and that Division I football coaches' compensation packages were rising at an extremely fast rate.

Wilson and Brown (2009) analyzed the contract dispute between the UK and former head men's basketball coach Billy Gillespie. Gillespie was dismissed after his second year as head coach. However, Gillespie never signed a formal seven-year contract with the university and thus worked off a signed memorandum of understanding. Gillespie believed he was still owed compensation for the remaining five years of his contract; the University disagreed. This case was eventually settled out of court, but Wilson and Brown's work provided a thorough analysis of the memorandum of understanding and other methods for coaches and athletic directors to protect themselves in the contract negotiation process.

Farmer and Pecorino (2010) approached coaching compensation from an economic perspective investigating the impact of college players' non-salaries on coaches' salaries and competitive balance. Their work postulated the NCAA demonstrates a cartel system whereby players not receiving a salary have a direct impact on head coaches' salaries.

Wilson, Schrager, Burke, Hawkins, and Gauntt (2011) performed a comparative analysis of the athletic and academic incentives contained in head men's basketball coaching contracts. Analyzing the 65 teams in the 2009 NCAA Men's Basketball Tournament, coaches were five times more compensated through incentive bonuses for team athletic performance than team academic performance. However, because this research focused on just one season, only a "snapshot" of the incentive compensation landscape was provided.

The current study serves as a continuation of Wilson et al.'s (2011) work and contained an analysis of the athletic and academic team performance incentive clauses for those coaches who participated in the 2012 NCAA Division I Men's Basketball Tournament. A secondary purpose was to conduct a comparative analysis between the 2009 and 2012 NCAA Division I Men's Basketball athletic and academic team performance contract incentives.

Method

Participants

Data were collected from the 2012 USAToday Division I Men's Basketball Coaching Compensation Database (USAToday, 2012) generated each year by the USAToday and presented during the NCAA Men's Basketball Tournament (MBT). Until 2010, this annual database contained .pdf files of each participating coaches' contract. Beginning in 2010, the database no longer included the contracts. Thus, data was compared from the last publically published contract year (2009) with obtained data from the 2012 contract year. A total of 68 teams participated in the 2012 MBT, however six schools (Brigham Young University, Creighton, Harvard, Iona, Lehigh, Long Island) were private schools and not required to submit data. Thus, the USAToday was able to compile financial data on 62 schools that participated in the 2012 MBT. Within this sample, data for 17 coaches' compensation packages came from the

particular institution's Federal Income Tax Returns and not from having the actual coaches' contracts. The final sample for athletic/academic team performance incentive analysis came for the 45 actual coaches' contracts included in the USAToday data base.

Data Base

This annual USAToday database is compiled by the sport's department staff and employees from the law firm of Stinson, Morrison, and Hecker, LLP. The 68 tournament teams are listed in alphabetical order in the following categories: school; conference; coach's name; school pay; other pay; total pay; and maximum bonus. Data for these categories were collected for 62 of the 68 participating schools in the 2012 MBT. A brief overview (USAToday, 2012) of the four main financial categories is presented below:

a) **School Pay** is the coach's base salary paid by the institution and other monies paid such as shoe and apparel, television, radio, other media appearances and personal appearances. This amount also included deferred payments, housing allowances, attendance or ticket sale benchmarks, signing and one-time bonuses.
b) **Other Pay** is the amount received for outside income reported.
c) **Total Pay** is the combination of school pay and other pay.
d) **Maximum Bonus** is the highest amount of monies paid if on court, classroom, and personal conduct bonuses are met.

Procedures

Data were analyzed in two areas: 1) Overall Income (OI); and 2) Incentive Income (II). First, the financial data from the 45 coaching contracts and 17 institutional Federal Income tax returns were collected and compiled into an OI database. This OI's database contained the following categories: conference, school, coach's name, guaranteed income, non-guaranteed income, annual pay, maximum bonus, and exemption status. Second, the coaches' financial athletic and academic incentive data from just the 45 actual coaching contracts included in the database were assimilated into the II database.

The data from the OI database were further categorized into two groupings: Automatic Qualifying (AQ) conference schools and Non- Automatic Qualifying (N-AQ) conference schools. The AQ Conferences that participated in the 2012 Division I MBT included: Atlantic Coast Conference (ACC), Big East, Big Ten, Big 12, Pac-12, and the SouthEastern Conference (SEC). The Non-AQ Conferences represented included: Mid-Atlantic, Atlantic-10, Colonial Athletic Association, American East, Conference USA, Mountain West, West Coast, Mid-American, Big Sky, Missouri Valley, Sun Belt, Northwest, Western Atlantic, Big West, Ohio Valley, Patriot League, Metro Atlantic, Ivy League, Mid-Eastern, Big South, Summit League, Southern, Allegheny East, Atlantic Sun, North East, Southland and South Western Athletic Conference.

A secondary analysis involved academic and athletic team performance incentives listed in the individual contracts contained in the II database. Because of each contract's uniqueness, only data from the 45 contracts with clearly delineated academic and athletic incentive clauses were included in the analyses. Once the incentives were identified and extracted from the contracts, they were then entered into the athletic and academic databases, respectively.

Data Analysis

Analyses were conducted in two primary areas: from the three OI categories and from the II (athletic and academic) incentive clauses in each contract.

Content analyses were conducted on the coaches' contracts and the institutions' Federal Income tax returns. Descriptive statistics were computed for the three general compensation categories (Guaranteed Income, Non-guaranteed Income, & Annual Pay; Table 1). Maximum bonus was omitted from the analysis because this category was compiled differently than bonus categories contained in the 2010 database. These data were further divided into two categories based on conference affiliation: BCS and Non-BCS conference schools (Table 2).

Table 1 - General Compensation: Category Totals and Category Means (n=62)

Category	Total	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Guaranteed Income	$84,166,377.00	$1,357,522.00	930270.39	$87,500.00	$4,987,578.00
Non-Guaranteed Income	$2,689,841.00	$99,624.00	5656.85	$500.00	$912,769.00
Annual Pay	$86,864,178.00	$1,401,035.00	1248070.02	$87,500.00	$5,387,578.00
Max Bonus	$17,503,291.00	$416,745.00	44547.72	$7,292.00	$1,400,000.00

Table 2 - General Compensation: AQ Conference vs. Non-AQ Conference Means

Category	Total	Mean	SD	Min	Max
AQ (n=32)					
Guaranteed Income	$69,091,545.00	$1,937,500.00	194454.36	$573,974.00	$4,987,578.00
Non-Guaranteed Income	$2,356,461.00	$157,097.00	42647.02	$1,200.00	$912,769.00
Annual Pay	$69,734,068.00	$2,249,486.00	237101.39	$573,974.00	$5,387,578.00
Max Bonus	$13,221,249.00	$550,885.00	10606.60	$109,375.00	$1,400,000.00
N-AQ (N=30)					
Guaranteed Income	$15,074,832.00	$502,494.00	28478.73	$87,500.00	$1,690,000.00
Non-Guaranteed Income	$333,380.00	$27,782.00	83438.60	$500.00	$150,000.00
Annual Pay	$15,416,172.00	$513,872.00	28478.73	$87,500.00	$1,690,000.00
Max Bonus	$16,652,314.00	$237,891.00	1414.00	$7,292.00	$655,000.00

Note: N-BCS = Non-BCS Conference

Secondary content analyses were conducted on the 45 actual coaching contracts contained in the database. This content analysis examined the athletic and academic team performance incentive clauses listed in each contract. Consistent with Wilson et al. (2011), the data were divided into two general categories (AQ and Non-AQ), and analyzed. Incentive financial data were placed into the following categories: Conference coach of the year; National coach of the year, Postseason appearance, Regular season champion, Elite Eight appearance, Final Four appearance, and NCAA champion. Only data clearly stated and defined were placed into the appropriate category. Descriptive statistical analyses were computed for each of these categories (Table 3). Academic incentive data were analyzed in a similar manner.

Table 3 - Athletic Incentives: AQ vs. Non-AQ Conference Schools

Category	Total	Mean	SD	Min	Max
AQ (n=24)					
Conference COY	$347,760.00	$24,840.00	7071.07	$10,000.00	$50,000.00
National COY	$715,521.00	$42,089.00	35341.91	$15,625.00	$100,000.00
Postseason Appearance	$506,802.00	$26,673.00	10606.60	$10,000.00	$50,000.00
Reg Season Conf Champs	$1,098,896.00	$54,944.80	3535.53	$15,000.00	$224,000.00
Elite Eight Appearance	$1,377,724.00	$68,886.20	56568.54	$10,000.00	$280,000.00
Final Four Appearance	$2,281,328.00	$99,188.17	106066.02	$20,000.00	$336,000.00
National Championship	$3,891,750.00	$176,897.73	141421.36	$25,000.00	$448,000.00
N-AQ (n=18)					
Conference COY	$77,000.41	$7,700.00	2828.43	$2,000.00	$15,000.00
National COY	$147,000.00	$21,000.00	3535.53	$2,000.00	$50,000.00
Postseason Appearance	$281,000.00	$16,529.41	2121.32	$3,000.00	$40,000.00
Reg Season Conf Champs	$209,000.00	$16,076.92	3889.09	$3,500.00	$50,000.00
Elite Eight Appearance	$322,250.00	$24,788.46	11490.49	$6,000.00	$56,250.00
Final Four Appearance	$719,750.00	$39,986.11	32450.24	$2,500.00	$100,000.00
National Championship	$1,276,000.00	$70,888.89	7071.07	$5,000.00	$250,000.00

Note: COY = Coach of the Year; Reg = Regular

As stated previously, due to the uniqueness in design of each coaches' contract, only data from clearly stated and written academic incentive clauses were analyzed and placed into one of the three following categories: Graduation percentage incentives; Academic Progress Report (APR) incentives; and Grade Point Average (GPA) incentives (Table 4).

Table 4 - Academic Incentives: AQ vs. N-AQ Conference Schools

Category	Total	Mean	SD	Min	Max
BCS (n=16)					
Graduation %	$291,000.00	$32,333.33	4419.42	$15,000.00	$75,000.00
GPA	$412,500.00	$29,464.29	3535.53	$5,000.00	$100,000.00
APR	$297,828.00	$21,273.43	10606.60	$5,000.00	$50,000.00
N-BCS (n=12)					
Graduation %	$10,000.00	$10,000.00	0	$10,000.00	$10,000.00
GPA	$91,000.00	$13,000.00	3535.53	$5,000.00	$25,000.00
APA	$128,000.00	$10,666.67	3535.53	$500.00	$25,000.00

Results

Initial content analysis of the coaches' contracts focused on the three general database categories (Guaranteed Income, Non-guaranteed income, and Annual Pay). Results are provided in Table 1.

Results indicated the average annual compensation for the 62 coaches was more than $1,400,000.00 million dollars. Wilson, et al., (2011) found the 2009 NCAA MBT coaches' contracts annual pay for 60 coaches was $73,955,503.00. The total annual pay for the 2012 coaches increased $12,908,675.00 to $86,864,178.00.

Of the 68 institutions participating in the 2012 NCAA MBT, 32 schools were classified as members of an AQ conference, while 36 were classified as a Non-AQ conference member. Compared to the 2009 NCAA MBT, there were six fewer AQ conference schools and nine more Non-AQ conference schools participating in the 2012 NCAA MBT. However, because six institutions were private and did not report income, the current participant group contained financial data from 32 AQ conference schools and 30 Non-AQ conference schools. These data are listed in Table 2. It was found that 6 less AQ Conference schools earned bids to the 2012 NCAA MBT (32 teams) than the 2009 NCAA MBT (38 teams) and nine more Non-AQ conference schools earned bids to the 2012 NCAA MBT (36 teams) than in the 2009 NCAA MBT (27 teams).

Content analysis of the 2012 NCAA MBT data indicated a $1,435,006.00 difference in average guaranteed income between AQ ($1,937,500.00) coaches and Non-AQ ($502,494.00) coaches. This gap increases to $1,735,614.00 when non-guaranteed income is added to guarantee income in comparing coaches' annual pay from AQ conference schools ($2,249,486.00) to the annual pay for coaches from Non-AQ conference schools ($513,872.00).

When compared to the same categorical totals from the 2009 NCAA MBT data, the 2012 average coaches' guaranteed income difference between AQ and Non-AQ conference schools increased by $200,843.00. In addition the gap increased by $384,533.00 when comparing the coaches' annual pay difference between AQ and Non-AQ conference schools from 2009 ($1,351,081.00) to 2012 ($1,735,614.00).

Content analyses conducted on the 2012 NCAA MBT coaches' contracts specifically focused on the incentive clauses for athletic team performance and academic team performance. The analyses identified 42 of the 45 (93.3%) contracts contained a form of athletic incentive with 24 of the 25 (96.0%) AQ Conference schools having an athletic incentive, while 18 of the 20 (90.0%) Non-AQ Conference schools had an athletic incentive.

The seven most common athletic incentive categories were: Conference Coach of the Year; National Coach of the Year; Postseason Appearance; Regular Season Conference Champion; Elite Eight Appearance; Final Four Appearance; and National Champion. Table 3 contains the descriptive analyses for these incentive areas. The total amount of athletic team performance incentives that could be earned by the 2012 AQ Conference coaches was $10,291,781.00 and the total amount of athletic team performance incentives that could be earned by Non-AQ Conference coaches was $2,955,077.00. When compared to the total amount of potentially earned athletic team performance incentive totals the 2009 AQ Conference coaches had the potential to earn $6,500,368.00, while the 2009 Non-AQ Conference coaches had the potential to earn $1,275,543.00. Athletic incentives increased a total of $3,719,413 for AQ Conference coaches and athletic incentives increased $1,679,534.00 for Non-AQ Conference coaches. Overall athletic incentives for coaches increased 69.4% from $7,775,911.00 (2009) to $13,174,858.00 (2012).

Analysis of the 2012 data found 28 of 45 (62.2%) agreements had various forms of academic incentives. Table 4 contains the descriptive analysis results for the incentive values of the three general academic incentive categories. Total potential compensation for the 2012 academic incentives was $1,230,328.00, with AQ Conference coaches potentially earning $1,001,328.00 and Non-AQ Conference coaches potentially earning $229,000.00 in academic incentives. Compared to the same 2009 academic incentive categories overall potential compensation was $2,411,650.00 or $1,181,322.00 more than the 2012 total. Further analysis found 2009 AQ Conference coaches were eligible to receive a total of $2,392,400.00 in

academic incentives and Non-AQ Conference coaches were eligible to receive $19,250.00 in academic incentives. When compared to 2012 AQ Conference contracts coaches were eligible for $1,391,072.00 less in academic incentives than 2009 AQ Conference coaches (Table 6). However, the 2012 Non-AQ Conference coaches were eligible for $209,750.00 more in academic incentives than the 2009 Non-AQ Conference coaches (Table 8).

Table 5 - 2009 AQ Potential Athletic vs. Academic Incentive Compensation



Table 6 - 2012 AQ Potential Athletic vs. Academic Incentive Compensation



Table 7 - 2009 Non-AQ Potential Athletic vs. Academic Incentive Compensation



Table 8 - 2012 Non-AQ Potential Athletic vs. Academic Incentive Compensation



Academic incentives were again found to be less prevalent than athletic incentives within the 2012 sample. Further descriptive analyses found 16 of 25 coaches' contracts (64.0%) from AQ Conference schools contained an academic incentive clause, while 12 of the 20 (60.0%) Non-AQ Conference Schools also contained an academic incentive clause. In comparison, the 2009

analyses found 21 of the 37 (56.7%) AQ Conference schools coaching contracts contained an academic incentive, while 11 of the 23 (47.8%) Non-AQ Conference schools contracts contained an academic incentive. These results indicated a continued imbalance between athletic and academic incentives between AQ and Non-AQ Conference schools.

Discussion

The main purpose of this study was to compare athletic and academic team performance incentive clauses from the contracts of head coaches who participated in the 2012 NCAA Division I Men's Basketball Tournament. Another purpose was to compare the current findings with the previous research (Wilson, et al., 2011) analyzing coaches' contracts who participated in the 2009 NCAA Division I Men's Basketball Tournament.

The current study makes a significant contribution to the literature in the following ways: 1) through a comparison of 2012 and 2009 data from the Division I Men's Basketball Tournaments, results indicated increases in total annual pay for both AQ and Non-AQ head men's basketball coaches; 2) Non-AQ experienced increases in both total potential athletic and academic incentive compensation, and 3) although Non-AQ schools are increasing salary, athletic, and academic incentives, a chasm exists between the "haves," i.e., (AQ Conference schools), and "have not's," (i.e., Non-AQ Conference schools) regarding athletic and academic team performance incentives.

Although there were five less AQ conference schools in the 2012 tournament, total annual pay for AQ conference coaches increased $3,999,702.00; from $65,734,366.00 in 2009 to $69,734,068.00 for an average salary of $2,249,486.00 in 2012. Furthermore, similar analysis of annual pay for Non-AQ coaches (7 more Non-AQ schools participated in the 2012 tournament) increased $7,195,035.00 ($8,221,137.00 in 2009 to $15,416,172.00 in 2012). This represents an 87.5% increase in total annual pay for Non-AQ coaches, with the average salary increasing from $357,440.00 in 2009 to $513,872.00 in 2012 (43.8% increase). Obviously there have been dramatic gains in Non-AQ head basketball coaches' compensation. A discussion of the "arms race" factors potentially influencing Non-AQ Conference schools coaching compensation decisions is warranted.

An illuminating example of how this "arms race" has gripped the Non-AQ conference schools is best illustrated in the newest contract signed by Shaka Smart, head men's basketball coach at Virginia Commonwealth University (VCU). In March of 2011, VCU was an 11th seed in the 2011 NCAA MBT and progressed to the Final Four where they were defeated by Butler University. VCU became only the third 11th seed to make the Final Four (Matuszewski, 2011). VCU has an enrollment of 32,000 students and participated in the Colonial Athletic Association (a Non-AQ Conference). As reward for the team's epic run, VCU's Smart was given a new 8-year contract extension that raised his total salary from $425,000.00 to $1.2 million per year. A significant portion of this raise was funded by an increase in student athletic fees (Brady, Upton, & Berkowitz, 2011). At the time of this extension VCU President Michael Rao commented, "Coach Smart's contributions to the university are unquantifiable…Smart's leadership has forever raised awareness of VCU as the major public research university it is." (Martuszewski, 2011, p.1). Two other Non-AQ Conference schools, George Mason and Butler Universities, have experienced similar unique success with their men's basketball teams having reached the NCAA Men's Basketball Final Four in the last six years. These institutions also rewarded their coaches with increased compensation packages raising the bar for Non-AQ head coaching compensation.

To compensate coaches at these elevated levels, universities must find the resources to support these endeavors.

A 2010 USAToday study of the 119 Football Bowl Subdivision athletic programs found an average of 60% of athletic income came from either the university's general fund or from the university's student fees (Gillum, 2010). Berkowitz, Upton, McCarthy, and Gillum (2010) found, through an analysis of 222 public institutions of higher education, students were charged $795 million to fund college athletic programs during the academic year 2008-2009. In addition, Denhart and Vedder's (2010) found students attending smaller conference schools (Mountain West, Conference USA, Sunbelt, Mid-American, & Western Athletic) typically paid between 14 to 17% of their fees to athletics. In comparison, only 4% of student fees were paid to athletics at larger conferences (Big 10, Big 12, SEC, Pac 10, ACC, & Big East). Denhart and Ridpath (2011) added to the athletic subsidization debate with a case analysis of how student fees are used with athletics at Ohio University (OU). Students at OU were found to be unaware of how much of their student fees were dispersed to athletics, while student enthusiasm for intercollegiate athletics was far less than claimed by proponents of intercollegiate athletics.

This athletic team success could also explain the increase in amount of athletic and academic incentive clauses being placed in Non-AQ Conference schools' coaching contracts. To retain top coaching talent, presidents of Non-AQ Conference schools might become more "creative" in contract structure, thereby adding more athletic and academic team performance incentives to coaches' contracts as a way to increase overall compensation. Furthermore, Non-AQ Conference athletic directors may be increasing the amount of academic incentives in these coaches' contracts as a means of continuing to emphasize the term "student-athlete".

Another explanation for these pay increases might be the acknowledgement a university can raise its public awareness through intercollegiate athletics. Frey (1982) offered three reasons why university presidents support intercollegiate athletics: 1) belief winning athletic programs attract students, financial donations, and legislative appropriations; 2) college football is the only program on a campus with the power to bring all campus constituencies together; and 3) the national recognition a successful athletics program can bring to a university. Sack and Straurowsky (1998) explained the "national recognition" motive for athletic success, as not a new concept in intercollegiate athletics, in their discussion of former University of Chicago's President, William Rainey Harper, as he hired Amos Alonzo Stagg to coach the university's football team in 1892. President Harper told Stagg to, "develop teams which we can send around the country and knock out all the colleges." This is one of the earliest documented examples of a university possibly attempting to grow its enrollment through its athletics' program. Enrollment data indicated the University of Chicago experienced enrollment growth from 1,815 to 5,500 students from 1896 to 1909 (Sack & Staurowsky). Several researchers have analyzed the relationship between intercollegiate athletic success and increases in admission applications (Ehrenberg, 2000; Sperber, 2000; Toma 2003;). Toma and Cross (1998) compared 30 schools that won a national championship in either football or men's basketball between 1979 and 1992 with a set of peer institutions to identify if an increase in admission applications coincided with athletic success. Their work found notable increases occurred in admission applications received relative to peer institutions in the year of the national championship and over the three years following. It should also be noted that several reasons factor into an increase in admission applications; a drive by university to increase enrollment, increase in admission resources, possible decreasing in admission requirements, etc.

Weaver (2011), an intercollegiate athletic director, discussed another possible reason for institutions placing more emphasis on athletic success. She defines this emphasis as "Mission creep"- when institutions on one level desire to become like institutions that reside on a higher Division level. Because of the large financial windfalls, Division I athletics are no longer reserved for the larger public universities; smaller schools (less than 5,000 students) have entered the fray (Weaver). Weaver also discusses the phenomenon known as "ticker envy." ESPN stations utilize a score "ticker" at the bottom of the screen which gives updated college football and college basketball scores. This type of name recognition can only be brought to an institution competing on the Division I level. Thus many institutions may have begun to develop "ticker envy" and want to be in the big time business that is intercollegiate athletics.

The recent billion dollar explosion of college athletic television rights has also driven a greater wedge between the "haves" and "have not's." The 2009 Knight Commission Report on Intercollegiate Athletics (Knight, 2009) reported in 2006-2007 the Big Ten Conference distributed approximately $154 million to its 11 members, while the Sun Belt Conference distributed approximately $1.2 million to its 9 members. As previously discussed, the Pac-12's television contract with the Fox/ESPN Networks and the Pac-12's television network launch, will allow the conference to distribute an average of $30 million to each of its member institutions (Martin, 2012).

The current research found overall college head men's basketball coaching compensation has continued to escalate. This escalation can be seen in guaranteed income, athletic, and academic incentives. The current sample's (2012) potential total compensation for athletic team performance was more than $13.7 million dollars compared to potential total compensation of approximately $1.2 million dollars for academic team performance incentives. In addition, results indicated 93.3% (42 of 45) of the coaches' contracts analyzed contained some form of athletic team performance incentive, while only 62.2% (28 of 45) of the coaches' contracts stipulated academic team performance incentives. These results supported Putler and Wolfe (1999); Inoue, et al., (2011); and Wilson, et al., (2011) findings. Putler and Wolfe found intercollegiate coaches were incentivized more for on-field team success than classroom team success. Inoue, et al. found that of the 84 Division I FBS head football coaches' contracts, 92.9% contained an athletic team performance incentive and 53.6% of the same contracts contained an academic team performance incentive. Wilson et al. (2011) found 43 of the 46 (93.5%) contracts contained an athletic incentive and 31 of the 46 (67.4%) contracts contained an academic incentive.

Unique to this research are the findings both athletic and academic incentive payouts have increased for Non-AQ head men's basketball coaches. Non-AQ conference school head men's basketball coaches experienced a 1074% increase in potential academic incentives from 2009 to 2012 (Tables 7 & 8). This increase may indicate institutions have begun to place more emphasis on the academic success of its "student-athletes." Another explanation may be the positive public relations potentially garnered with placing an emphasis on coaches developing "student-athletes" through incentivizing team academic success. Another plausible explanation may be the increase in academic incentives simply provides a more competitive compensation package for head coaches. Either way, these data lend further support the intercollegiate "arms race" continues to drive intercollegiate athletic spending.

Future research in college coaches' contract incentives may benefit from qualitative data utilizing university presidents, athletic directors, attorneys, and head men's basketball coaches' contract construction and negotiations. Additional comparisons should explore NCAA head

women's basketball coaches' athletic and academic incentive clauses. Carpenter and Acosta (2005) stated that, on average, Division I women's basketball head coaches do not have the same level of financial compensation as men's coaches. However, it is possible similar compensation trends may be evident. Finally, more empirical research of coaching contracts in intercollegiate sports such as football would help to further understand the potential depth and vastness of this prong of the intercollegiate "arms race."

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