The Sandusky Child Sexual Abuse Scandal: The Implications for Athletic Department Procedures, Training, Policy, and Child Welfare System Interactions

Emmett L. Gill, Jr.
North Carolina Central University

Terrence Allen
North Carolina Central University

The following is a narrative and critique of the Gerald A. Sandusky child sexual abuse scandal at Pennsylvania State University (Penn State). Using a convenience sample of regional and national media accounts, this manuscript summarizes the confirmed events of the Penn State sexual abuse controversy. This case study focuses on a) the child sexual abuse of three victims, b) the Penn State athletic department and university responses, and c) the interactions between Penn State and state and local child welfare systems. Next, the manuscript will present conceptual and analytical considerations related to the Sandusky child sexual abuse scandal including the perpetrators profile and grooming strategies as well as coaches power and morality. The practical implications for sport managers are presented and include recommendations for procedures, training, policy development, and interactions with child welfare systems.

Authors Note: At the time of this manuscript was conceived and developed the Paterno commission had yet to be developed and their subsequent report was not available. The authors acknowledge that other reports on the Sandusky child sexual abuse scandal exist including the document resulting from the Paterno family investigation. However, the Freeh report was the most comprehensive document available and it was used as the basis to levy National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) sanctions against Penn State University.

Long praised for what has been presumed to be its all but magical capacity to build character and to bestow moral and ethical integrity college sport is today mired in an apparently expanding morass of misguided priorities, exploitation, corruption, commercialism, and even criminality. (Edwards, 1985, p.3, para 1).
This 27-year old quote underscores the notion that morals, character, and ethics have long been issues among collegiate student-athletes, coaches, and athletic department officials in leadership positions (Conn & Gerdes, 1998; Harrison-Dyer, 2011; Eitzen, 1995; Hums, Barr, & Gullion, 1999; Jordan, Greenwell, Geist, Pastore, & Mahony, 2004; Peterson, 2011; Stoll, 2011; Wolverton, 2006; Wyatt, 2002). Having evolved from an extracurricular activity to a win-at-all-costs endeavor episodes in collegiate sports continue to raise moral and ethical concerns (Conn & Gerdes, 1998; Cullen, Latessa, & Byrne, 1990). When sports scholars think of morals, character, and ethics images of student-athletes demonstrating poor decision-making in recruitment (Entertainment and Sports Programming Network, 2011), initial eligibility (Himmelsbach, 2012), continuing eligibility (Paxton, 2012), and financial support (Feinstein, 2012; Gorman, 2010) emerge. Coincidentally, visions regarding morality also now increasingly include Football Subdivision (FBS) head coaches and sport administrators who experience dilemmas involving extramarital relations (Graves, 2009), untruthfulness (ESPN, 2011), student-athlete abuse (HLN, 2012), and strip clubs (Paulus, 2003). The Gerald A. Sandusky child sexual abuse scandal a Pennsylvania State University (Penn State) suggests that the scope of concerns about coaches morals and ethics should expanded to include child sexual abuse and its impact on victims and athletic departments.

Our client has to live the rest of his life not only dealing with the effects of Sandusky's childhood sexual abuse, but also with the knowledge that many powerful adults, including those at the highest levels of Penn State, put their own interests and the interests of a child predator above their legal obligations to protect him," (Associated Press, 2012a).

Although collegiate football is a religion, the sexual abuse of children is one of the most heinous crimes in American society, and Gerald A. Sandusky committed the ultimate sin. When Sandusky, a former Penn State defensive coordinator, was convicted of 45 counts of sexual abuse, one linchpin in the controversy was the role Penn State head football coach Joseph Vincent “Joe” Paterno played in covering up at least one episode of child sexual abuse (Drape, 2012). The Freeh report concluded that Paterno and other Penn State officials "failed to take any steps, for 14 years, to protect the children who Sandusky victimized." (ESPN, 2012, para 45). The Penn State, Syracuse University (CNN, 2011), Catawba University (Bethea, 2012), and The Citadel (Caulfield, 2011) serious challenges arise when sexual abuse scandals unfold within big-time collegiate sports programs. The power and privilege that accompany FBS collegiate football can compromise the morals and ethics of head football coaches, athletic department personnel, and university leadership. According to news reports, in all four cases the sexual abuse allegations were known to coaches and administrators, but not initially reported to external law enforcement or child welfare officials. The lack of reporting and safeguards to protect victims that characterized the Sandusky child sexual abuse scandal raises questions about the influence of big-time collegiate sports and coaches on child sexual abuse in sports.

FBS college football teams and their coaches are essential to the identity of public and private universities. Reverend Theodore Hesburgh, the University of Notre Dame President Emeritus, referred to coaches as the CEO’s of multimillion dollar athletic enterprises (Zimblast, 2010) who “can become laws unto themselves" (Hesburgh, 1991, para 3). FBS head coaches spearhead public relations and provide a face for fund raising, recruit highly touted athletes, and
coach or instruct student-athletes year around. Within FBS football operations there are approximately 50 to 60 coaches and staff and 85 to 110 scholarship and non-scholarship student-athletes under an FBS coach’s supervision (Keating, 2012). FBS head coaches enjoy an enormous amount of power and privilege; not just in football circles, but across college campuses, the states, and the nation. FBS head coaches’ supremacy is apparent in their compensation packages. The average compensation for a FBS head coach is $1.5 million and this figure reflects an increase of $400,000 from the average 2011 salary for FBS head coaches (Zirin, 2012). Some FBS head coaches earn five to ten times more than their university presidents (Zimblast, 2010). In addition to FBS head coaches salaries, power is accompanies by privilege including endorsements, speaking engagements, country club memberships, no interest loans, insurance annuities, and summer camps (Greenberg & Smith, 2007). Other components of FBS programs, intended to build social capital, are community service events that occur during each game and throughout the course of the entire year. Community service in collegiate sports involves philanthropy in several ways including cancer awareness, autism, foster care, and secondary school academic performance, but a common theme is work with vulnerable children (Hall, 2012). Community building is consistent with the original purpose of college football, however the practice also provides an avenue for predators to groom vulnerable children.

The Sandusky child sexual abuse scandal at Penn State presents a great opportunity to explore child sexual abuse in sports and ponder intervention and prevention strategies. Sport organizations and institutions in the United States have been slow to learn more about sexual abuse by coaches (Brackenridge, 1997; Brackenridge, 2001; Kirby, Greaves, & Hankivsky, 2000; Leahy, Pretty, & Tenenbaum, 2002; Volkwein et al., 1997). Coaches, who are also teachers or mentors, hold dual power over students who are athletes (Brake, 2012; Shakeshaft, 2003). Child sexual abuse in recreational settings receives less attention that exploitation in other settings (Brackenridge & Kirby, 1997; Gallagher, 2000) and the transgression is exacerbated by the actuality it is reported less often than other forms of sexual abuse (Gallagher, 2000). Only a handful of studies explore sexual abuse by collegiate coaches and none exist on a non-collegiate student-athlete being sexually abused by a collegiate coach. Male same sex child sexual abuse victims are less likely to report and the likelihood of disclosure can be obscured by attempts to protect the reputation of the institution (Sullivan & Beech, 2002).

The Sandusky sexual abuse case study will explore an interdisciplinary approach that combines the fields of sport management and social work. Social work draws on theories of human development, social theory, and social systems to analyze situations and facilitate individual, organizational, and social change (International Federation of Social Workers, 2008). Social work typically addresses vulnerable populations (Gitterman, 1991) including children and adolescents, sexual abuse (Saunders, 1988), foster care (Munro, 1999), non-profit programs, and sport as a social intervention. Spiegel (2003) discusses child sexual abuse as a bio-psycho-social problem that is best understood within an ecosystems perspective, a common framework in the social work profession. Sport management is any combination of skills related to planning, organizing, directing, controlling, and leading within the context of an organization or department whose primary product or service is related to sport (Parks, Quarterman, & Thibault, 2010). Sport management typically pertains to learning how to manage non-human assets, but the field is expanding curricula to include knowledge building on how to manage coaches, senior athletic department personnel, and student-athletes. Sport is one of humankind’s fundamental institutions and as such sport management should demonstrate social concern (Zeigler, 2007).
The Sandusky child sexual abuse inquiry is based on a descriptive case study or in-depth examination of a recent and contemporary event (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007; Flyybjerg, 2006). Case studies allow for the interpretation and analyses of unique cases within single settings (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 1994). A case study is the appropriate methodology to explore the Sandusky child sexual abuse scandal because the case study method promotes an understanding of a social situation by interpreting the central actors and interrelated activities (Feagin, Orum, & Sjoberg, 1990). The documents used to analyze the Sandusky case consisted of print news articles, Internet news articles, news magazine stories, the Freeh report, and the Pennsylvania Statewide Grand Jury Report. Media texts can help structure social relations and oftentimes serve as a space where groups strive to influence social ideals (Davis, 1993). Internet news sites included http://msnbc.com, http://philly.com, http://reuters.com, http://espn.com, http://highered.com, and http://huffingtonpost.com. National newspapers included The New York Times, The USA Today, and The Philadelphia Inquirer. A total of 38 articles were utilized to document the central themes including perpetrators’ motivation and grooming, FBS head coaches’ power, privilege, and morality, and athletic department staff interactions with child welfare systems. The number of articles was limited to 38 because of saturation (Royce, Thyer, Padgett, & Logan, 2002).

The popularity of intercollegiate football generated tremendous interest in the Sandusky child sexual abuse scandal and as a result there are several layers to the controversy including Joe Paterno’s firing, the NCAA sanctions, the new Penn State football coach, and the transformation of the Penn State football legacy. Nonetheless, this case study focuses on a) the child sexual abuse of three victims, b) the Penn State athletic department and university responses, and c) the interactions between Penn State and state and local child welfare systems. Next, the manuscript will present conceptual considerations related to the Sandusky child sexual abuse scandal including the perpetrators motivation, grooming strategies, power and privilege, and morality. To close, the authors will provide recommendations for athletic department procedures, training, policy development, and interactions with child welfare systems. The context of the Sandusky child sexual abuse scandal is critical to avoiding a reductionist approach (Hunter, 1990).

The Penn State Child Sexual Abuse Scandal

In 1969, Penn State hired Gerald A. Sandusky as an assistant football coach, in 1977 he founded the Second Mile Charity, and in 1999 he became the defensive coordinator (Johnson, 2011a; Pearson, 2011). The Second Mile charity began as a home for foster children and grew into one of the largest providers of youth social services in Pennsylvania (Moore & Rubinkam, 2012). The non-profit thrived, in part, because of Sandusky’s status as a Penn State football alumnus, defensive coordinator, and potential future Penn State head coach. Sandusky’s status afforded him with access to Penn State athletic facilities and fields for Second Mile camps serving at-risk children. The Second Mile charity reached more than 200,000 kids per year through its school-based programs, organizational leadership institute, and summer camps (Ganim, 2012).
1998: Victim 6, a Penn State Detective, and Sandusky’s Retirement

On May 3, 1998, Victim 6’s mother became suspicious when her son and Sandusky showed up at her home with wet hair (Johnson, 2012c). Victim 6 acknowledged he showered with Sandusky prompting his mother to call the Penn State police. Victim 6 shared with his mother that Sandusky wrestled with him, kissed his head, and expressed his love for him (Simpson & Morgan, 2012). While in the shower Sandusky wrapped his arms around victim 6’s chest and lifted him up near his own waist (Freeh, Sporkin & Sullivan, 2012, p.42). On May 4, 1998, the victim’s mother called Alycia Chambers, a licensed state college psychologist, who previously worked with her son, to inquire if she was overreacting. Chambers advised the victim’s mother to make a report to the authorities and around 11:00 am she reported the incident to Penn State detective Ron Schreffler (Freeh, Sporkin & Sullivan, 2012).

During the morning hours of May 4, 1998, Schreffler interviewed victim 6 and he shared that Sandusky also showered with his ten-year old friend. Later that day, Chambers interviewed victim 6 and he expressed he felt “like the luckiest kid in the world” to go sit on the sidelines at Penn State football games (Freeh, Sporkin & Sullivan, 2012, p.42). Victim 6 did not want anyone to speak to Sandusky about the allegations because he might not invite him to anymore Penn State football games. On May 4, 1998, Chambers made a child sexual abuse report to the Pennsylvania child abuse line (Freeh, Sporkin & Sullivan, 2012).

During the afternoon hours of May 4, 1998, Schreffler contacted John Miller, a Centre County Children and Youth Services (CYS) worker, about victim 6’s allegation. However, on May 5, 1998, the Department of Public Welfare (DPW) took the lead in the case because of several conflicts of interest between CYS personnel and service contracts with Penn State and the Second Mile. DPW assigned the case to Jerry Lauro.

On May 5, 1998, Schreffler also contacted Karen Arnold, a Centre County prosecutor, to share that she did not “have to worry about Old Main sticking their nose in the investigation” (Freeh, Sporkin & Sullivan, 2012, p.43). On the same day, Penn State police decided to delay making a crime log entry for the Sandusky allegation, which would have made the incident a public record. On May 7, 1998, Lauro interviewed victim 6’s mother. Additionally and according to Schreffler, he shared copies of a previously recorded statement with Lauro. However, Lauro shared that Schreffler did not provide full access and that if he had seen Chambers report, then he would not have stopped the investigation. At the time Lauro thought that Sandusky’s behavior fell into a gray area that involved boundary issues (Freeh, Sporkin & Sullivan, 2012, p.44). Lauro shared that “it wasn’t until Schreffler told me that there wasn’t anything to the case that I closed mine.” (Freeh, Sporkin & Sullivan, 2012, p.142).

John Seasock, a social service worker contracted by CYS to provide counseling services, conducted another psychological evaluation of victim 6. Seasock concluded that because victim 6 was not forced and did not feel uncomfortable, that “there seems to be no incident which could be termed sexual abuse.” (Freeh, Sporkin & Sullivan, 2012, p.42). Further, Seasock concluded that victim 6 had not been placed in a situation where he was being groomed for future sexual victimization (Freeh, Sporkin & Sullivan, 2012, p.44). On May 8, 1998, Schreffler discussed with Seasock his evaluation and Seasock concluded there were gray areas and that he had never heard of a 52-year old man becoming a pedophile (Freeh, Sporkin & Sullivan, 2012). Schreffler also questioned Seasock regarding his awareness of the case details and Seasock acknowledged that he was not aware of some of the case details. Seasock, who served as an independent
contractor for Penn State from 2000 to 2006, eventually concluded that Sandusky’s behavior was “normal and there was no indication of child abuse” (Freeh, Sporkin & Sullivan, 2012, p.45).

At the direction of the police, on May 19, 1998, the boy’s mother met with Sandusky again. As they listened from another room, law enforcement officers heard the mother ask Sandusky whether his “private parts” touched the boy while they hugged. Sandusky said, “I don’t think so ... maybe.” (Freeh, Sporkin & Sullivan, 2012, p.45). Sandusky admitted telling the boy that he loved him. Sandusky asked to speak with her son and the mother replied that she did not feel that was a good idea. Sandusky responded, “I understand. I was wrong. I wish I could get forgiveness. I know I won’t get it from you. I wish I were dead.” (Freeh, Sporkin & Sullivan, 2012, p.45). The law enforcement officers did not question Sandusky. Sometime between May 27 and June 1, 1998, District Attorney Ray Gricar declined to prosecute the case. Gricar has been missing since 1998.

In 1999, Jerry Sandusky retired as the Penn State defensive coordinator (Simpson, 2012). Sandusky received emeritus status, access to Penn State Athletic facilities, a lump sum salary of $168,000, football and basketball season tickets, and 168 acres of land for the Second Mile (Freeh, Sporkin & Sullivan, 2012; Johnson, 2012b).

2001: Victim 2, Mike McQueary, and Victim One

On February 9, 2001, Mike McQueary, a former Penn State football student-athlete and then current graduate football assistant went to the locker room in the Lasch Building between 9:00 and 9:30 pm (Freeh, Sporkin & Sullivan, 2012). Upon opening the locker room door McQueary heard “rhythmic slapping sounds” from the shower (Statewide Grand Jury, 2011, p.6). McQueary looked into the shower through a mirror and saw Sandusky and a 10 year-old boy. McQueary expressed he saw Sandusky “directly behind the boy” with his arms around the boys’ waist (Freeh, Sporkin & Sullivan Report, 2012, p.66). McQueary slammed his locker shut and moved towards the shower (Freeh, Sporkin & Sullivan, 2012). McQueary shared with the grand jury that Sandusky and the boy separated and looked directly at him (Statewide Grand Jury, 2011). McQueary went to his office and called his father who advised him to leave the building and come home where the two decided McQueary should inform his immediate supervisor Joe Paterno the next morning (Freeh, Sporkin & Sullivan, 2012, p.66; Statewide Grand Jury, 2011).

On February 10, 2001 McQueary reported the alleged sexual abuse to Penn State head football coach Joe Paterno. McQueary explained to Paterno that he saw Sandusky and “a young boy in the shower and that it was way over the lines and described that the activity was extremely sexual in nature.” (Freeh, Sporkin & Sullivan, 2012, p. 67). McQueary expressed he reported the incident to Paterno because “he’s the head coach and he needs to know things that happen inside the program and inside that building.” (Freeh, Sporkin & Sullivan, 2012, p.67). On February 11, 2001, Paterno reports what McQueary shared with him to Penn State athletic director Tim Curley and Vice-president Gary Shultz. Paterno shared with the Curley and Schultz that McQueary told him he saw Sandusky “fondling – or whatever you might call it – I’m not sure what the term would be – a young boy.” (Freeh, Sporkin & Sullivan, 2012, p.67). On the same day, Schultz reaches out to Wendell Courtney, then outside legal university legal counsel, to discuss reporting suspected child sexual abuse. On February 12, 2001, Shultz and Curley met with then Penn State president Graham Spanier (Freeh, Sporkin & Sullivan, 2012). On February 12, 2001, Shultz and Curley agree to discuss the sexual abuse with Paterno and then
Sandusky. Shultz, Curley, and Spanier agree that unless Sandusky admits he has a problem that
Curley should report Sandusky to the Department of Public Welfare (DPW). Approximately 10
days later McQueary met with Curley and Shultz to share that he had witnessed “Sandusky
having anal sex with a boy in the Lasch building showers.” (Statewide Grand Jury, 2011, p.7,
para 3; Freeh, Sporkin & Sullivan, 2012, p.72). Curley informed McQueary that Sandusky’s
locker room keys have been taken away, however law enforcement or child welfare officials do
not interview McQueary (Johnson, 2012a).

On February 25, 2001, Curley met with Paterno. The next day Curley recommended a
different course of action – not to report the child sexual abuse. On March 5, 2001, Curley met
with Sandusky and explained that he could no longer bring boys to the Penn State facilities.
Sometime between March 6 and March 15, 2001, Curley informed Jack Raykovitz, the Second
Mile executive director, of Sandusky’s alleged sexual assault. After Raykovitz met with two
board trustees he determined Sandusky’s behavior and actions are a non-incident (Freeh, Sporkin
& Sullivan, 2012). Raykovitz met with Sandusky and reiterated Curley’s restrictions regarding
bringing children to campus. Sandusky indicated that the mandate only applied to Penn State
locker rooms. Penn State does not make an effort to identify and insure the safety of the boy
McQueary witnessed being sexually assaulted.

2001: Victim One, a Reluctant Mandated Reported, and the Penn State Fallout

In the spring of 2007, Sandusky invites victim one to a summer camp and begins
spending time with victim 1 by having him stay overnight at the coach’s residence (Van Natta,
2012). Sandusky began visiting victim 1, who was then 11 years old and also a track student-
athlete (Statewide Grand Jury, 2011), in his basement bedroom to massage and crack his back
(Johnson, 2012c). Between 2007 and 2008, victim 1 testified that Sandusky performed oral sex
on him more than 20 times (Johnson, 2012c). Oftentimes, victim 1 asked his mother to tell
Sandusky he was not home when the coach called. In 2009, victim 1’s mother complained to
local school district officials that Sandusky, a volunteer football coach at the school, had sexually
assaulted her son (Associated Press, 2011a).

After victim 1 revealed the information to his school principal she reminded the victim’s
mother of Sandusky’s solid reputation in the community and asked her to “go home and think
about it” (Rhee, Wagschal, & Tran, 2012). The victim’s mother, angered that school officials
cautions her against going immediately to authorities with information about such a prominent
figure, went directly to the Clinton County Children and Youth Social Services office (CCCYS)
(Johnson, 2012c, para, 45). The victim and his mother showed up at CCCYS with no advance
notice. An initial interview with a female staffer proved uncomfortable to the victim and his
mother and they were referred to Mike Gillum, a CCCYS psychologist (Johnson, 2012c; Rhee,
Wagschal, & Tran, 2012). According to Gillum, before the victim was referred to him the boy
provided enough information, regarding incidents of fondling, kissing and other inappropriate
contact to indicate Sandusky was a child sex abuser (Johnson, 2012c).

The conclusion triggers a series of notifications and telephone calls to the Pennsylvania
State Police, Second Mile charity, and the boy’s high school. School district officials banned
Sandusky from school grounds and contacted the police. The reporting of the incident led to an
investigation by the state police and attorney general’s office (Associated Press, 2011a). On
November 5, 2011, Gerald A. Sandusky is arrested and charged with 40 criminal counts
stemming from the sexual abuse of eight boys (Everson, 2011). On November 11, 2011, the
sexual abuse scandal becomes public via the statewide grand jury. On November 11, 2011, Curley is placed on administrative leave, Shultz retires, and both surrender to complaints they failed to alert police to sexual abuse allegations and committed perjury in front of a grand jury (Staples, 2011). On November 9, 2011, Penn State President Graham Spanier resigns and longtime head coach Joe Paterno is fired (McGill, Assad, & Patrick, 2011).

**Conceptual Framework**

The conceptual framework for the Sandusky child sexual abuse case study includes a) perpetrator profiles, b) child sexual abuse grooming, and c) the influence of powerful FBS coaches in child sexual abuse. There are several models for conceptualizing sexually abuse perpetrator profiles (Finkelhor, 1984; Finkelhor & Araji, 1986). However, Dziech and Weiner (1984) developed a psychological profile of men in the academy consisting of four types of perpetrators, including ‘The Opportunist’, ‘The Counselor/Helper’, and ‘The Power Broker’. ‘The Counselor/Helper’ flatters and nurtures the student, ‘The Opportunist’ takes advantage of particular locations and situations, and ‘The Power Broker’ is coercive and demands favors from victims (Dziech & Weiner, 1984). Irrespective of the perpetrators profile grooming sets the foundation for child sexual abuse.

Grooming refers to any strategy used to convince a child to engage in sexual behavior (Finkelhor, 1984; Salter, 1995). Grooming includes shifts of progression and regression and is not linear (Neilson, 1998). Volkwein, Schnell, Sherwood, and Livezey (1997) describe grooming as a process of careful selection, systematic preparation, enticement, and entrapment. Within the sport grooming process there are several stages including targeting the victim, building trust, developing isolation and control, initiating sexual abuse, and securing secrecy (Brackenridge & Kirby, 1997). Following sexual victimization, and even after some victims realize that the abuse is wrong, survivors may continue to endure exploitation. At this point, the victim enters another phase that includes 1) falling into a cycle of dependency, 2) sexual attention, 3) guilt, and 4) reinforced dependency (Brackenridge, 1997). If the perpetrator owns some form of authority over the victim, then there is less resistance.

In general sport institutions in the United States (US) know very little about collegiate coach-athlete sexual abuse on account most studies are outside the US and samples include elite amateur athletes (Fasting, Brackenridge, & Sundgot-Borgen, 2003; Kerr & Stirling, 2008). Perpetrators who have some form of authority over the victim deserve special attention. In studies on child sexual abuse committed by authority figures, a disproportionate number of accusations were made against coaches (Shakeshaft, 2003). The power of a coach is akin to the supremacy of a priest because their authority is rarely challenged (Brackenridge, 1997) and one indicator is that abuse can transcend into victims non-sport roles (Brackenridge, 1997; Tofler, Stryer, Micheli, & Herman, 1996; Tomlinson & Yorganci, 1997). The Sandusky child sexual abuse scandal led to increased reporting of interscholastic sports sexual abuse cases, but we know little how the phenomenon plays out when exploitation involves a collegiate coach and boys.

A distinct social psychology exists around males and same-sex child sexual abuse (Hartill, 2009). Male survivors are more reluctant to report sexual abuse than girls (Finkelhor, 1984; Knopp, 1986). The reluctance of males to report sexual abuse originates from the socialization of boys and taboos linked to homosexuality (Faller, 1989). Detection of male same-sex sexual abuse also is less likely because boys are more likely to be victimized outside
The Sandusky Child Sexual Abuse Scandal

A child sexual abuse perpetrators position as an assistant football coach, within a prominent football program, can impact a head coach’s moral decision-making.

A moral problem is defined as a situation in which a dilemma is experienced between individual values and norms and those of other people (Van der Arend, 1999). Morality suggests that individuals should be able to differentiate independently and reasonably from right and wrong (Arnold, 1999). Ethical problems interconnect with morality and can be understood as difficult issues requiring a moral solution (Aitamaa, Leino-Kilipi, Puukka, & Suhonen, 2010). Ethics refer to exploring acts that may be judged as right or wrong or when a choice has to be made between two equally unsatisfactory alternatives (Jordan, Greenwell, Geist, Pastore, & Mahony, 2004). Humphrey, Janosik, and Creamer (2004) provide a model for the interrelationship of ethics, morals, and acting responsibly. Two principles at the core of the model are nonmaleficence or “doing no harm” and beneficence or “benefiting others” (Kitchener, 1985, p.21).

In general, professionals in higher education position their personal and professional needs before acceptable ethical behavior (Agle & Kelley, 2001). In particular, sport coaches and administrators give less attention to the moral side of character (Rudd & Mondello, 2006). Duquin (1984) examined the moral rationales of male coaches via a series of conflicting sport scenarios and discovered male coaches were more inclined to use the self-interest rationale. The failure of Paterno to “do more” to insure Sandusky’s child sexual abuse was reported could be attributed to attempts to exercise his power and protect his self-interest. Powerful and privileged FBS head coaches are now the norm in collegiate sports (Carey, 2000; Eitzen, 1995). Power refers to “an individual's capacity to influence another person to do something they would not have done had they not been influenced” (Richmond, McCroskey, Kearney, & Plax, 1987, p.142). In 2010, when Ohio State's (OSU) football team was being investigated for multiple NCAA impermissible benefits violations, OSU President Gordon Gee was asked whether he had considered firing Coach Jim Tressel. "Fire him? I just hope he doesn't fire me." Gee responded (Feinstein, 2012, para 3). FBS head football coaches are allowed to operate autonomously, in terms their program’s physical location and governance, and this sovereignty can bestow a sense of privilege and entitlement (Grasgreen, 2012).

Analysis

Of Dziech and Weiner’s (1984) five seduction scripts Sandusky, as a perpetrator, was an Opportunist and Counselor, but his defining characteristic was that of a Power Broker. Sandusky’s status as a Penn State football defensive coordinator provided him with the traits of a Power Broker – access, a network of influential people, and a positive public reputation. Sandusky’s persona helped him to acquire other roles such as the role of counselor/helper via the Second Mile charity. Sandusky committed and enormous amount of time to creating the Second Mile organization and embarked on a $7 million campaign for the non-profit. Schultz suggested that if Sandusky had stopped committing so much time to the organization, then he might have become the next head football coach. As an Opportunist, Sandusky used the privileges afforded by his first role to serially groom and sexually abuse boys. Opportunities to sexually abuse were present because of Sandusky’s access to Penn State football facilities, practices, games, tickets, cash, computers, bowl games, and clothing (Freeh, Sporkin & Sullivan, 2012). Sandusky also
capitalized on the opportunities provided by parents, school officials, and Penn State senior leadership.

Sandusky invested in grooming, or deliberate actions undertaken with the aim of befriending a child in order to lower their inhibitions, at least 10 male children (Finkelhor, 1984; Salter, 1995). Sandusky provided excessive attention, secured isolation, broke down barriers, provided gifts, and created fear among his victims. A psychologist testified that Sandusky has a “histrionic personality disorder” which is characterized by an excessive need for attention (Kim, 2012; Thomasch & Dunham, 2012). Next, Sandusky displayed excessive attention towards his victims via emails, letters and, phones calls. In one letter sent by Sandusky to his victim 1 he wrote, "I know that I have made my share of mistakes. There has been love in my heart. My wish is that you care and have love in your heart." (Hoffman, 2012, para 2; Reuters, 2012b, para 7).

Sandusky also placed 118 calls to victim 1’s home between 2008 and 2009 (Johnson, 2012). In terms of isolation, one victim stayed over at Sandusky's house two or three weekends a month and without first speaking with the child’s mother (Morgan & Shade, 2012). Sandusky isolated and assaulted five different child victims at Penn State football facilities and other places on campus (Freeh, Sporkin & Sullivan, 2012). Another victim testified that when Sandusky was a volunteer football coach at his school that the coach would routinely ask an assistant coach, and teacher, to get him out of class (Rhee, Wagschal, & Tran, 2012). Sandusky methodically broke down victim’s inhibitions and systematically prepared them for abuse. One victim shared that his relationship with Sandusky progressed from the coach putting his hand on his leg, to showering together at Penn State facilities, to oral sex, (Simpson & Morgan, 2012). Another victim noted that Sandusky would put his hand on the his leg “…like I was his girlfriend. It freaked me out extremely bad,” (Armas & Scolforo, 2012, para 10). The victim added that when he would push Sandusky’s hand away it would come right back (Armas & Scolforo, 2012).

Sandusky targeted male children with an interest in sports and his influence in sports impacted the perpetrators ability to groom victims by showering them victims with gifts. Sandusky shared with victim 1 and his mother that the boy had athletic potential and later started taking him to sporting events (Rhee, Wagschal, & Tran, 2012). Again, Sandusky provided all of his victims with sport-related gifts including golf clubs, sneakers, athletic clothing, game tickets, bowl trips, and visits to Penn State sports facilities (Simpson & Morgan, 2012; Statewide Grand Jury, 2011). One victim accompanied Sandusky to the 1995 Rose Bowl, two victims accompanied Sandusky to a Philadelphia Eagles football game, and another victim traveled with he and his wife to the 1999 Alamo Bowl (Freeh, Sporkin & Sullivan, 2012). Sandusky provided a gift in the form of a contract, to one of his victims. Additionally, Sandusky and the male child victim had an arrangement, signed on a football program, that if he maintained his grades and trained for sports, then he would receive $1,000 for college expenses from the Second Mile (Reuters, 2012a).

The intersection between a victims desire for attention, sport benefits, and fear can reinforce their dependency and further cement secrecy of sexual abuse (Brackenridge & Kirby, 1997; Volkwein, Schnell, Sherwood, & Livezey, 1997). Sandusky’s victims feared they would be hurt by or lose the benefits of being associated with the assistant coach and the Penn State athletic program (Nielsen, 2001). Victim 4 endured Sandusky’s sexual contact because of the prestige and attention and privileges of Sandusky’s Penn State connection. “I didn't want to lose the nice things that were happening to me,” according to victim 4 (Simpson, 2012, para 3). Victim 7 previously did not reveal the abuse because he also feared losing Sandusky’s perks. "I didn't want my parents to keep me from going to games," said the survivor (Reuters, 2012a).
Another victim did not want to get Sandusky in trouble and still wanted to hang out and go to the games with him (Reuters, 2012b). Sandusky also induced fear of physical harm in some victims. Victim 1’s psychologist shared that the boy expressed that he believed that Sandusky could have him killed (Johnson, 2012c). “If he found out that I told all that happened, I thought he could hurt me,” another victim shared (Reuters, 2012a).

This portion of the analysis will combine elements of power and moral decision-making theories and focus on head football coach Joe Paterno. Paterno was knowledgeable of Sandusky showering with one male child, but he did not ensure the safety of the victim, ensure his sexual abuse report was known to social service or law enforcement officials, and afterwards created an environment for further victimization. Paterno engaged in immoral decision-making that he attributed to ignorance of child sexual abuse, but it appeared to be influenced by nonmaleficence and self-interest. Joe Paterno suggested that he did not know exactly how to handle the sexual abuse and he “never had to deal with something like that and didn’t feel adequate,” (Boren, 2011, para 8). Not only did Paterno claim to be ignorant, but also other Penn State leaders expressed their ignorance. Upon receiving the report from Paterno Curley, Shultz and Spanier claimed to be ‘ignorant’ on account the explanation by Paterno did not truly describe the severity of Sandusky’s abuse.

Nonetheless, Joe Paterno’s immoral decision-making likely had the greatest impact on facilitating Sandusky’s serial child sexual abuse and appeared to be dependent on a desire to protect the self-interest of Penn State football (Duquin, 1984). Again, Paterno decided not to try to identify the two victims Sandusky sexually abused in the Penn State football facilities in 1998 or 2001. After the janitor and McQueary witnessed Sandusky’s child sexual abuse, the football program was struggling, earning 10 wins and 13 losses. Paterno became the target of criticism and calls to resign (Fittipaldo, 2003). In 2002, a year after the sexual abuse was apparent, the Penn State football program returned to its winning tradition and the calls for Paterno to resign quieted. In 2001, if Paterno reported Sandusky’s abuse to law enforcement officials, then it would have jeopardized his employment and opportunity to become the FBS head coach with the most wins. Lastly, Paterno’s power to influence decisions was evident in the janitors’ testimony and two emails from senior administrators indicating the need for Paterno’s approval.

When Joe Paterno did not report the 1998 or 2001 child sexual abuse incidents and influenced the senior administrators decision not to report he demonstrated a lack of beneficence (nonmaleficence) for Sandusky’s victims (Kitchener, 1985). Paterno, given his vast power and influence, should have understood that he needed to make the sexual abuse report, or support the Penn State senior leaders decision to report, for the allegation to have added credence. Curley, Shultz, and Spanier agreed to report Sandusky, but the next day and after talking with Paterno, Shultz expressed that he was “uncomfortable with what the three previously agreed.” (Associated Press, 2012c). Twenty-eight days passed between the reporting of the child sexual abuse incident and DPW officials interview with Sandusky. Then Paterno resolved to make further provisions for Sandusky by providing him with a 1999 retirement package that included an office, phone, and an agreement to develop a Penn State and Second Mile collaborative.

Implications

The Sandusky child sexual abuse scandal has far-reaching implications for athletic department procedures for working with children, training, policy development, and protocol for interactions between athletics and child welfare services. The depth of the implications of the
Sandusky child sexual abuse scandal are reflected in the National Collegiate Athletic Association’s sanctioning of the Penn State football program including a $60 million fine, 4-year post-season ban, loss of 40 scholarships, and five-year probation period (ESPN, 2011; Thamel, 2012). Additionally, Florida recently passed a state law whereas university employees who “knowingly or willfully” fails to report child sexual abuse or presents another person from doing so will result in a $1 million fine. Sport managers should be aware of the repercussions when they “provide abusers with almost limitless opportunities for the manipulation and abuse of children,” (Sullivan & Beech, 2002, p.153).

All athletic department staff should partake in professional development efforts that will discourage child sexual abuse and raise awareness of its prevalence in sports. First, athletic department training efforts should speak to all types of sexual harassment and abuse including child sexual abuse, statutory rape, date rape, gang rape, and other forms of sexual assault that may occur because of situational factors in collegiate athletics and sport community relations. Athletic department personnel should have a firm understanding of the threshold for or what constitutes abuse (i.e., showering and towel popping). Secondly, professional development efforts should speak to perpetrator characteristics such as grooming techniques as well as victim characteristics such as personality types and indicators for abuse. Additionally, athletic department training efforts that include case studies on previous collegiate sports sexual abuse scandals, including those at the University of Alabama at Birmingham and Colorado, can help athletic departments understand peers responses, roles and responsibilities, and how to critically think through how to intervene in a manner that ensures victim safety. Training efforts also should include a review of existing and emerging university child sexual abuse prevention and intervention policies.

The Sandusky child sexual abuse scandal should provide athletic departments with the incentive to enhance protocol for coaches and student-athletes interactions with children, staff and volunteer background checks, and procedures to report child sexual abuse to the heads of the athletic department and university as well as law enforcement and child welfare officials. First, the athletic department should have policies in place specifying the number and gender of adults who must be present when interacting with children (Indiana University, 2012). Second, multi-state background checks on coaches, volunteers, and student-athlete’s working with children and adolescents during academic year and summer camps, should become the norm. Additionally, and when feasible, athletic departments should further investigate potential full-time or summer employees with background checks that revealed they resigned from a previous position where they had authority over children. Fourth, athletic departments will benefit from designing clear policies for child sexual abuse reporting such as time limits for reporting, who to report to in the athletic department and at the university, and separate and specific procedures for reporting directly to child welfare and law enforcement officials. Equally important, strategies should be developed and directed towards children who interact with athletic department coaches, student-athletes and staff. In particular, strategies should include mechanisms for reporting and tools to communicate the means for children to report.

Overall, university officials should understand that some university athletic staff, namely coaches who also are professors or instructors, team doctors, and trainers are considered mandated reporters of all forms of abuse. Resolving the lack of clarity regarding whether collegiate coaches, graduate assistants, and trainers are mandated reporters is paramount. Furthermore, all athletic staff should know that state child protective service laws and policies
mandate that suspected abuse must be reported to the person in charge of institution or a
designated person and the specific time period for reporting.

Child Welfare & Law Enforcement Systems

The reality DPW, CYS, and CCCYS officials interacted Penn State officials throughout
the investigation and the length of their investigations suggests that child welfare officials
deviated from protocol in the Sandusky child sexual abuse scandal. Child welfare workers and
supervisors should be trained on how to manage sexual reports from collegiate coaches and
athletic department leadership. First, child welfare workers should understand the structure
and culture of athletic departments that include prominent FBS programs. Child workers and
administrators should understand how athletic department situational factors could facilitate
sexual abuse including characteristics of student-athletes, coaches, and administrators. Greater
understanding of athletic department norms will help decrease the likelihood of child welfare
workers feeling intimidated by coaches, athletic directors, or university detectives. Secondly and
in light of the unique athletic department situational factors, child welfare workers should
understand advocating for vulnerable children includes assisting law enforcement officials in
assembling effective legal cases. Assembling affective cases benefits from an understanding that
disclosure is a process rather than an event. Lastly, child welfare workers should be reminded
that there are some existing tools to help manage current cases and help prevent future
victimization. For example in Pennsylvania, there was a database on sexual abuse perpetrators
(Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare, 2012). If the information on Sandusky’s 1998
incident would have been entered into the database, then it is plausible Sandusky’s opportunities
to sexual victimize vulnerable children would have been vastly reduced.
References


role-of-coaches-and-the-codes-of-ethic/


Johnson, K. (2012b, June 12). *Defense calls wife as key witness. USA Today, 3A.*


http://reuters.com/assets/print?aid=USBRE85E1FE20120615


